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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Demand response is the largest underutilized reliability resource in North America. 
Historic demand response programs have focused on reducing overall electricity 
consumption (increasing efficiency) and shaving peaks but have not typically been used 
for immediate reliability response. Many of these programs have been successful but 
demand response remains a limited resource. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) report, Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering 
(FERC 2006) found that only five percent of customers are on some form of demand 
response program. Collectively they represent an estimated 37,000 MW of response 
potential. These programs reduce overall energy consumption and they also reduce stress 
on the power system at times of peak loading. 
 
More recently demand response has begun to be considered, and in some cases actually 
used, to directly supply reliability services to the power system. Rather than reducing 
overall power system stress by reducing peak loading over multiple hours these programs 
are targeted to immediately respond to specific reliability events. This is made possible 
by advances in communications and controls and has benefits for the power system and 
the load.  
 
Unfortunately, preconceptions concerning load response capabilities, coupled with 
misunderstandings of power system reliability needs, are limiting the use of responsive 
loads. In many places loads are prohibited from providing the most valuable reliability 
services in spite of their being evidence that their response can be superior to that of 
generators. This is denying the power system of a valuable reliability resource. It is also 
denying loads the ability to sell valuable services. 
 
This report addresses a number of common misconceptions concerning responsive load 
and power system reliability interactions. It is structured as a set of short questions and 
answers and is intended for power system operators, planners, regulators, load owners, 
and other interested parties. 
 
The report is organized into three chapters. Chapter 1 is this introduction. Chapter 2 
contains questions and answers on demand response and power system reliability. 
Chapter 3 provides conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
 
 
A. What types of response can load provide? 
 
There are five basic types of load response as shown in Figure 1. All of them have some 
impact on power system reliability; some have a greater impact than others. Energy 
efficiency reduces consumption during all hours and typically reduces the need for 
generation and transmission. It is not focused on times of greatest power system stress 
and may not provide as cost effective reliability response to specific reliability problems 
as more directed alternatives. Price responsive load and peak shaving both target specific 
hours when response is desired: the former facilitates voluntary market response to price 
signals while the latter utilizes direct control commands. Both types can be used to 
address capacity inadequacy caused by a lack of generation or a lack of transmission. 
Reliability response (contingency response) and regulation specifically target power 
system reliability needs and offer the greatest reliability benefit per MW of load from 
loads that are capable of providing these types of response. 
B. What are the reliability services? 
 
Reliability services are “extra” functions which must be performed in order to reliably 
supply the electric power that customers actually value. Restructuring of the electric 
power industry has required that these various functions, previously provided by the 
vertically integrated utility, be unbundled to facilitate competition. FERC defined the 
• Energy Efficiency programs reduce electricity consumption 
and usually reduce peak demand
• Price Response programs move consumption from day to 
night (real time pricing or time of use)
• Peak Shaving programs require more response during peak 
hours and focus on reducing peaks every high-load day
• Reliability Response (contingency response) requires the 
fastest, shortest duration response. Response is only 
required during power system “events” – this is new and 
slowly developing
• Regulation Response continuously follows the power 
system’s minute-to-minute commands to balance the 
aggregate system – this is very new and may have the 
potential to dramatically change production costs, especially 
for aluminum and chlor-alkali
Figure 1 All five basic types of demand response impact power system reliability. 
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ancillary services as those functions performed by the equipment and people that generate, 
control, and transmit electricity in support of the basic services of generating capacity, 
energy supply, and power delivery. These services are required to respond to the two 
unique characteristics of bulk-power systems: the need to maintain a balance between 
generation and load in near real-time and the need to manage power flows through 
individual transmission facilities by redispatching generation and load. (Hirst and Kirby, 
2003) 
 
FERC specifically recognized six key ancillary services in its landmark Order 888 (FERC 
1996): (1) Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service; (2)  Reactive Supply and 
Voltage Control from Generation Sources Service; (3) Regulation and Frequency 
Response Service; (4) Energy Imbalance Service; (5) Operating Reserve - Spinning 
Reserve Service; and (6) Operating Reserve - Supplemental Reserve Service. Table 1 
lists the key real-power ancillary services, the ones that ISOs generally buy in 
competitive markets.  
 
Ancillary services provide the system operator with control over the real-time 
generation/load balance. Traditionally generators have dominated supplying ancillary 
services allowing system operators to control the supply of energy to match the current 
demand. This balance of supply and demand can be done equally effectively by 
controlling the load side of the equation. 
 
C. Which reliability services might responsive loads provide? 
 
The services which responsive loads may be willing and able to provide are noted in blue 
in Table 1. Each load must evaluate the costs and benefits of providing each ancillary 
service but more expensive services are, naturally, typically more attractive to sell. 
 
Scheduling, System Control and Dispatch Service is the provision of the system operator 
control center etc. This is not a service that loads or generators can provide.  
 
Reactive Supply and Voltage Control from Generation Sources Service deals with the 
supply and control of dynamic reactive power. This is needed to maintain stable voltages 
throughout the power system. Some loads with large solid state drives may be able to 
provide dynamic reactive power to the power system and they should discuss this with 
their transmission provider. Reactive power requirements are much more location 
specific than real power requirements so each case tends to require individual 
negotiations. 
 
Regulation and Frequency Response Service provides the continuous minute-to-minute 
balancing of generation and load under normal conditions. This is the most expensive 
ancillary service. Most balancing authorities dedicate about 1% to 1.5% of their 
generation to supplying regulation. In regions with independent system operators and 
ancillary service markets it is the most expensive ancillary service. Some loads may be 
capable of supplying regulation. 
 
   
 4 
 
Table 1 Definitions of Real-Power Ancillary Services 
Service Description 
Service Response Speed Duration Cycle Time Market Cycle 
Price Range* 
(average/max)
$/MW-hr 
Normal Conditions 
Online resources, on automatic generation control, that can respond rapidly to system-
operator requests for up and down movements; used to track the minute-to-minute 
fluctuations in system load and to correct for unintended fluctuations in generator 
output to comply with Control Performance Standards (CPSs) 1 and 2 of the North 
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC 2006) 
Regulating 
Reserve+ 
~1 min Minutes Minutes Hourly 35-40
# 
200-400 
Similar to regulation but slower. Bridges between the regulation service and the hourly 
energy markets.  
Load 
Following or 
Fast Energy 
Markets ~10 minutes 10 min to hours 
10 min to 
hours Hourly - 
Contingency Conditions 
Online generation, synchronized to the grid, that can increase output immediately in 
response to a major generator or transmission outage and can reach full output within 
10 min to comply with NERC’s Disturbance Control Standard (DCS) 
Spinning 
Reserve 
Seconds to <10 
min 10 to 120 min 
Hours to 
Days Hourly 
6-17 
100-300 
Same as spinning reserve, but need not respond immediately; resources can be offline 
but still must be capable of reaching full output within the required 10 min 
Non-Spinning 
Reserve 
<10 min 10 to 120 min Hours to Days Hourly 
3-6 
100-400 
Same as supplemental reserve, but with a 30-60 min response time; used to restore 
spinning and non-spinning reserves to their pre-contingency status 
Replacement 
or 
Supplemental  
Reserve <30 min 2 hours Hours to Days Hourly 
0.4-2 
2-36 
Other Services 
The injection or absorption of reactive power to maintain transmission-system voltages 
within required ranges 
Voltage 
Control 
Seconds Seconds Continuous Year(s) $1-$4/kvar-yr 
Generation, in the correct location, that is able to start itself without support from the 
grid and which has sufficient real and reactive capability and control to be useful in 
energizing pieces of the transmission system and starting additional generators. 
Black Start 
Minutes Hours Months  to Years Year(s) - 
* Prices are approximate ranges in $/MW-hr for 2005 and include California, ERCOT, and New York. 
+ Ancillary services which loads may wish to sell are shown in blue 
# Up and down regulation prices for California and ERCOT are combined to facilitate comparison with 
the full-range prices of New York  
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Energy Imbalance Service is really an accounting function that accommodates any 
differences between scheduled and actual transactions. It is not a “service” that individual 
generators or loads provide. Load following is a related service that compensates for the 
inter- and intra-hour changes in demand. This is the slower counterpart to regulation. 
 
Operating Reserve - Spinning Reserve Service is generation (or responsive load) that is 
poised, ready to respond immediately, in case a generator or transmission line fails 
unexpectedly. Spinning reserve begins to respond immediately and must fully respond 
within ten minutes. Enough contingency reserve (spinning and non-spinning) must be 
available to deal with the largest failure that is anticipated. Some regions allow 
appropriate loads to supply spinning reserve but many currently do not. 
 
Operating Reserve – Non-Spinning Reserve Service, is similar to spinning reserve 
except that response does not need to begin immediately. Full response is still required 
within 10 minutes. Appropriately responsive loads are typically allowed to supply non-
spinning reserve. 
 
Replacement or Supplemental Reserve is an additional reserve required in some 
regions. It begins responding in 30 to 60 minutes. It is distinguished from non-spinning 
reserve by the response time frame. Appropriately responsive loads are typically allowed 
to supply replacement or supplemental reserve. 
 
D. How are ancillary services characterized? 
 
The five real-power ancillary services are distinguished by the response speed, duration, 
and frequency of deployment. Exact definitions vary somewhat from region to region but 
the general characteristics for these services and voltage control are shown in Figure 2.  
0.1 1 10 100
TIME (MINUTES)
Regulation
Load Following or Energy Imbalance
Spinning Reserve
Non-Spinning Reserve
Replacement or Supplemental Reserve
Voltage Control
Contingency Operations
Normal Operations
Figure 2 Response time and duration differentiate ancillary services. 
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Two services (regulation and load following or energy imbalance) continuously balance 
the system under normal conditions. Regulation provides the minute-to-minute balancing 
through automatic generation control. Load following and energy imbalance address the 
intra- and inter-hour balancing requirements. 
 
Three services (spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and replacement or supplemental 
reserve) are continuously poised to respond but are only deployed in the event of a 
contingency; the sudden failure of a generator or transmission line.  
 
E. How often are spinning reserves called upon? What response length is 
required? 
 
Spinning reserves continuously stand ready to respond whenever a generator or 
transmission line fails. They deploy autonomously and automatically through if the 
failure is large enough to shift system frequency outside of the governor deadband, as 
shown in Figure 3.  
The system operator can also order spinning reserves to respond if the contingency is not 
large enough to depress system frequency but is large enough to adversely impact the 
real-power interchange between control areas (area control error – ACE). If the 
contingency is small enough the system operator may be able to address it with regulation 
and changes to the economic dispatch.  
 
Figure 4 shows the number times between January 1994 and February 2001 where 
WECC frequency dropped by more than 0.1 hz. WECC averaged slightly fewer than one 
0.1 hz frequency event per month during this seven year period. Figure 5 shows the 
actual use of contingency reserves from both frequency excursions and system operator 
deployments for New York, New England, and California. Both California and New 
England deploy contingency reserves about twice per month. New York uses contingency 
reserves about ten times more frequently. 
5 9 .9 0
5 9 .9 2
5 9 .9 4
5 9 .9 6
5 9 .9 8
6 0 .0 0
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G e n e ra t io n
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Figure 3 Frequency immediately drops and spinning reserves respond 
autonomously in this example where two nuclear plants tripped in ERCOT. 
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Figure 4 WECC experienced 77 events where frequency dropped by more than 0.1 
hz between January 1994 and February 2001. 
 
Figure 5 also shows that in all three balancing areas the contingency reserve deployment 
is typically short, averaging around ten minutes, but is occasionally longer.  
 
Figure 5 ISOs differ in the frequency of their use of contingency reserves but 
reserve deployment is typically fairly short. 
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Reliability rules typically require spinning (and non-spinning) reserve resources to be 
capable of sustaining their response for two hours. This requirement is somewhat at odds 
with the way the set of reserves are designed to work together and the requirement that 
the power system restore its reserves within 60 to 90 minutes to be prepared for the next 
contingency. Figure 6 shows the coordinated response of the ancillary services. The 
system operator tries to restore the reserves as quickly as possible to prepare the system 
to withstand the next contingency.  
 
 
Figure 6 Ideally, spinning and non-spinning reserves should be restored within 30 
minutes to prepare the system for the next contingency. 
 
F. Why are some loads a particularly good match for power system reliability 
requirements?  
 
The power system need for rapid response that typically lasts ten to thirty minutes but 
which can occasionally last longer, shown in Figure 6 and Figure 5, matches the response 
capability of some loads quite well. (Kirby 2003) Air conditioning loads, for example, are 
capable of numerous short curtailments and infrequent sustained curtailments. They can 
be rapidly restarted and are ready to immediately respond again should another 
contingency arise. They do not have ramping time, minimum on time, or minimum off 
time limits that constrain some generators. 
 
Some responsive loads are technically superior to generation when supplying spinning 
reserve, the ancillary service requiring the fastest response. Many can curtail 
consumption faster than generation can increase production. The only time delay is for 
the control signal to get from the system operator to the load; much faster than the 10 
minutes allowed for generation to fully respond. When responding to system frequency 
-10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120 130 140 150
Minutes
Contingency
Occurs
Spinning & Non-Spinning Reserve
Frequency
Response
Reserves "Should" 
be Restored
Reserves 
"Must" be 
Restored 
(NERC)
Market Response
Reserves 
"Must" be 
Restored 
(WECC)
Replacement or Supplemental Reserve
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deviations the curtailment can be essentially instantaneous. Communications delays are 
not encountered because frequency is monitored at the load itself.  
 
G. Why would loads rather provide reliability response than peak reduction? 
 
Supplying contingency reserves is technically more attractive to some loads than 
providing peak reduction because the response duration and response frequency are 
shorter. Peak reduction requires actually responding, typically for multiple hours per day, 
often for multiple days in a row, during times when the load could be performing a useful 
function for its owner. Air conditioning loads provide a good example. Peak load 
reduction is typically required at exactly the time when the air conditioning itself is most 
needed. In fact, the power system peak is typically created by the air conditioning load.  
 
Providing contingency reserves requires that the load be poised to respond immediately if 
a power system emergency occurs but to operate normally otherwise. This imposes a 
technical communications and control requirement on the load but does no otherwise 
interfere with loads normal function. 
 
Supplying faster, shorter, ancillary services is often more attractive economically as well. 
Ancillary service prices value response speed rather than duration. 
 
H. How are ancillary services valued and what are the prices? 
 
Hourly markets exist in several regions for up to five ancillary services: regulation (up 
and down in some markets), spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve, and replacement 
reserve. Regulation is always the most expensive service followed by spinning reserve, 
non-spinning reserve, and replacement reserve. Some markets split regulation into 
regulation up and regulation down. This distinction is semantic rather than technical. 
Regulation prices in split markets can be compared with combined markets simply by 
adding the up and down prices. 
 
Ancillary service costs are driven primarily by opportunity cost. In order to sell into the 
ancillary service markets, generators must withhold capacity from the energy market. The 
cost the generator has to charge (or bid) to supply a reserve service is based primarily on 
the difference between the generator’s production cost and the energy sale price for that 
hour. A generator with a production cost of $50/MWH, for example, would bid $10/MW-
hr to sell spinning reserve if the energy price was $60/MWH ($60/MWH revenue - 
$50/MWH cost = $10/MWH profit or $10 per MW of generating capacity profit each 
hour from energy sales). At any price higher than $10/MW-hr for spinning reserve the 
generator makes more profit by forgoing the energy sale and selling spinning reserve. 
Conversely, at any price below $10/MW-hr for spinning reserve the generator would lose 
money by staying out of the energy market. 
 
One consequence of this linkage between energy and ancillary service markets is that 
ancillary service prices are inherently more volatile than energy prices. Contingency 
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reserve prices, for example, are typically zero at night when numerous generators are at 
minimum load and have capacity available at essentially no cost. 
 
Note that the price unit for reserves is $/MW-hr. This is because the generator is selling 
one MW of capacity (not energy) for one hour. The generator is standing ready to 
produce but it is not necessarily producing. In fact, if the generator does deliver any 
energy during the hour the cost of the energy will be settled separately, either at the 
generator’s cost or at the spot energy price. Typically the energy component of the 
ancillary services is not major. This terminology is not universal but it does make the 
distinction between the energy and capacity components clear. 
Hourly ancillary service market price data is available since September 2000 for 
California, since October 2001 for New York, and since April 2003 for ERCOT. Monthly 
averages of hourly prices are shown in Figure 7. Total regulation prices (regulation up 
plus regulation down) are shown for California and ERCOT to make them comparable to 
the New York regulation product which is a combined up and down service. 
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Figure 7 Monthly average regulation prices are typically (but not always) somewhat 
lower than energy prices. 
 
Figure 7 shows that regulation prices, which include no fuel component, are in the same 
range as real-time energy prices and are at times higher. Also, both energy and regulation 
prices are volatile, even on a monthly average basis. Regulation price also tends to track 
energy price, because of the lost opportunity cost.  
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Figure 8 compares all of the ancillary services on a monthly average price basis. Again, 
prices are volatile but over the 3.5 years regulation is always significantly more 
expensive than spinning reserve which is more expensive than non-spinning reserve and 
replacement reserve. 
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Figure 8 Ancillary service prices in all markets follow a pattern where regulation is 
most expensive and replacement reserve is least expensive. 
Figure 9 expands the view of 2005 making it easier to compare the various services. 
Figure 10 provides an average daily view from June 2005. Here the typical daily price 
patterns can be seen. Contingency reserve prices are typically at or near zero overnight 
when there is significant generating capacity that is backed down. Conventional thermal 
plants that can not cycle off overnight drive the price of spinning reserve down. Fast start 
plants keep the price of non-spinning reserve and replacement reserves at zero overnight. 
The California total regulation price actually rises at night as the regulating units are 
forced above minimum in order to have the capability to provide down regulation. Table 
2 provides a numerical comparison of the average annual prices for each service in each 
region.  
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Figure 9 Regulation is always the most expensive ancillary service as shown by these 
2005 monthly average ancillary service prices. 
 
 
Figure 10 June 2005 average hourly ancillary service prices show a consistent 
pattern. 
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
$80
Ja
nu
ary
Fe
bru
ary
Ma
rch Ap
ril
Ma
y
Ju
ne Ju
ly
Au
gu
st
Se
pte
mb
er
Oc
tob
er
No
ve
mb
er
De
ce
mb
er
$/
M
W
-h
r
CA Reg Tot CA Spin CA Non Spin CA Replacement
NY Reg NY Spin NY Non Spin NY 30 Min
ERCOT Reg Tot ERCOT Responsive ERCOT Non Spin
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
$60
$70
0:00 6:00 12:00 18:00 0:00
$/
M
W
-h
r
CA Reg Tot CA Spin CA Non Spin CA Replacement
NY Reg NY Spin NY Non Spin NY 30 Min
ERCOT Reg Tot ERCOT Responsive ERCOT Non Spin
   
 13 
Table 2 Annual average and maximum ancillary service prices from four markets 
for five years. 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 Annual Average  and Maximum $/MW-hr 
California 
Regulation 26.9 
111 
35.5 
164 
28.7 
166 
35.2 
188 
38.5 
399 
Spin 4.3 
250 
6.4 
92 
7.9 
125 
9.9 
110 
8.4 
225 
Non-Spin 1.8 
92 
3.6 
92 
4.7 
129 
3.2 
125 
2.5 
110 
Replacement 0.90 
80 
2.9 
55 
2.5 
90 
1.9 
36 
1.5 
70 
ERCOT 
Regulation  16.9 
177 
22.6 
156 
38.6 
1451 
25.2 
351 
Responsive  7.3 
150 
8.3 
51 
16.6 
731 
14.6 
351 
Non-Spin  3.2 
249 
1.9 
400 
6.1 
510 
4.2 
125 
New York East 
Regulation 18.6 
99 
28.3 
195 
22.6 
99 
39.6 
250 
55.7 
250 
Spin 3.0 
150 
4.3 
55 
2.4 
44 
7.6 
64 
8.4 
171 
Non Spin 1.5 
45 
1.0 
3 
0.3 
3 
1.5 
64 
2.3 
171 
30 Minute 1.2 
45 
1.0 
3 
0.3 
3 
0.4 
4 
0.6 
31 
New York West 
Regulation 18.6 
99 
28.3 
195 
22.6 
99 
39.6 
250 
55.7 
250 
Spin 2.8 
150 
4.2 
55 
2.4 
44 
4.9 
50 
6.0 
45 
Non Spin 1.4 
45 
1.0 
3 
0.3 
3 
0.6 
13 
0.9 
38 
30 Minute 1.2 
45 
1.0 
3 
0.3 
3 
0.4 
4 
0.6 
31 
 
I. Why is regulation always the highest priced ancillary service? 
 
The direct costs for generators supplying regulation include a degraded heat rate and 
increased wear and tear on the unit. The dominant expense, however, is the lost 
opportunity cost associated with maneuvering the generator in the energy market so that 
it has capacity available to sell in the regulation market. For example, a 600-MW 
generator with a full power energy production cost of $15/MWh would have to bid 
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$27/MW-hr of regulation if the energy market were clearing at $30/MWh. This is to 
compensate the generator for the lost profit in the energy market when it reduces output 
in order to create maneuvering room to supply regulation and to compensate for the 
reduced efficiency (~1.6% regulating heat rate penalty for this generator) associated with 
the remaining output’s still being sold into the energy market. Figure 11 shows how a 
generator’s cost (and bid price) to supply regulation depends upon the current energy 
price. Note too that this generator is limited to supplying only about 12 MW of regulation 
(~2% of its rated capacity). This is because regulation is a quick service and the unit 
ramp rate, rather than the total available capacity, limits the peak amount of regulation it 
can provide. For this reason regulation is generally spread across several generators. 
Opportunity costs similarly dominate contingency reserve prices. 
 
Figure 11 Regulation costs are dominated by generator opportunity costs. Cost at 
night can be higher than during the day. 
There is also an opportunity cost when the energy market price is below the generator’s 
marginal production cost. When energy prices are low (typically at night) and generators 
are at minimum load, they incur a cost for running above minimum load in order to 
supply down regulation. For example, a generator with a 150-MW minimum load and an 
energy production cost of $18/MWh would have to bid $54/MW-hr of regulation if the 
energy market were clearing at $14/MWh because it would be losing $4/hr for each of 
the 162 MW (150 MW minimum load + 12 MW of regulation = 162 MW average 
operating point) it must sell into the energy market to get its base operating point high 
enough to provide room to regulate down.  
 
Responsive load is likely to be a regulation price taker because generators dominate the 
regulation supply at present. If responsive load becomes a significant player in the 
regulation market the regulating loads’ direct and opportunity costs will become 
important for determining the hourly regulation price. 
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J. What determines contingency reserve market prices? 
 
Contingency reserve cost drivers are essentially a subset of the regulation cost drivers. 
Because contingency reserves deploy infrequently there is no significant degradation in 
heat rate and no increased wear-and-tear on the unit. Only the opportunity costs are 
incurred because the unit must withhold capacity from the energy market. 
 
On occasion a generator can incur additional costs to provide contingency reserves. For 
example, a generator would have to bid a significant price to supply spinning reserve if 
the generator’s production cost was higher than the market energy price and the generator 
could otherwise shut down. In this case the spinning reserve bid would have to cover all 
of the losses the generator was incurring in the energy market to operate at minimum load. 
Similarly, a generator could incur some costs to supply non-spinning and supplemental or 
replacement reserves if it was necessary to pay plant operators to standby. 
 
Responsive loads play a significant role in supplying spinning reserves in Texas but they 
are currently limited to supplying no more than 50% of the total requirement. Though 
allowed to participate in the non-spinning and replacement reserve markets responsive 
loads do not dominate those markets either. Consequently it is the generation cost drivers 
that currently set ancillary service prices.  
 
K. What characteristics are required for load to provide reliability services? 
What types of loads have these characteristics? 
 
Communications and control are the critical characteristics that determine if a load is 
capable of providing reliability reserves. Load must be controllable if it is to supply 
reliability services to the power system. The control must be fast and accurate. The load 
must also have a way to receive deployment commands from the power system operator. 
Faster services (spinning reserve and regulation) require automatic response to system 
operator commands. Spinning reserve also requires that the load sense and respond 
autonomously to reductions in power system frequency. The required response speed and 
duration depend on which reliability service is being provided.  
 
From the loads’ perspective important additional characteristics include sensitivity to 
electricity price and storage capability. Storage of product or energy within the load is 
valuable to free the load to respond to power system needs without hurting the loads’ 
primary function. Sensitivity to electricity prices is typically required to get the loads’ 
interest. 
 
Air conditioning loads (residential and commercial, central and distributed) can be ideal 
suppliers of spinning and non-spinning reserves. Many pumping loads are good 
candidates (water, natural gas, and other gasses). Any industrial process with some 
manufacturing flexibility is a good candidate (cement, paper, steel, aluminum, refining, 
air liquefaction, etc.). The list is endless. 
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Regulation is more difficult for loads to supply but electrolysis loads such as aluminum 
and chlor-alkali production appear to be excellent candidates. 
 
L. Can load response really provide the critical spinning reserve reliability 
function? Isn’t it better to let load provide peak reduction and replacement 
reserves? 
 
The inherent physical response capability of some loads is a better match to the fast, short, 
less frequent physical response requirements of spinning reserve than it is to the longer 
duration, more frequent response requirements of peak reduction or replacement reserves. 
For some loads, the advanced warning given before response is required for the slower 
services has little benefit. Advances in communications and control technologies make 
the fast response possible. Residential air conditioning loads, for example, can provide 
significantly more spinning reserve response, for example, than they can provide peak 
reduction.  
 
One fundamental characteristic that helps determine which service a responsive load can 
best provide is the amount of storage the load has available. Storage may be in terms of 
widgets a factory is producing, the thermal mass of a building, pressure in a gas pipeline, 
water in a reservoir, or any other result electricity is used to produce. There is typically 
enough thermal storage in a residence, for example, to allow the air conditioner to be 
turned off for ten to twenty minutes. Longer interruptions may be acceptable if they are 
infrequent. This matches the power system’s requirements for spinning reserves which 
are often deployed for ten minutes and infrequently deployed or an hour or more. Peak 
reduction typically requires response lasting many hours and occurring for at least several 
days in a row. Providing advanced warning does little to increase the residences’ ability 
to sustain longer response. Many (but not all) commercial and industrial loads have 
similar characteristics. 
 
Blocking responsive loads from providing the services that they are best matched to 
provide is bad for the power system and bad for the loads. It denies the power system of 
an excellent reliability resource for the most critical reliability needs. It denies the loads 
the ability to supply the most valuable response service. 
 
M. Do responsive loads have the technical capability to provide regulation? 
 
Regulation, the minute-to-minute varying of generation or consumption at the system 
operator’s command in order to maintain the control area’s generation/load balance, is 
the most difficult ancillary service for loads to provide. Automatic generation control 
(AGC) commands are typically sent from the system operator to the regulating generators 
about every four seconds (Figure 12). Regulation is also the most expensive ancillary 
service so it may be the most attractive service to sell for loads that are capable of 
supplying it. 
 
Some loads may have the inherent capability to provide regulation. Loads that are 
electronically controlled potentially could follow automatic generation control commands. 
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Loads with large adjustable speed drives or solid state power supplies are candidates. 
Product quality must be independent of the rate of electricity consumption to allow the 
power system operator to adjust the load’s consumption. Energy efficiency can be 
impacted by the rate of electricity consumption. Efficiency reductions simply impact the 
cost of regulation from the process.  
 
Excess production capacity is required for loads to provide regulation. The load must 
back down from full production and average lower production in order to have sufficient 
capacity move up in load when directed by the system operator. Similarly, the load can 
not be at minimum production because there must be room to reduce consumption when 
directed.  
 
 
A number of load types may have the capability and inclination to provide regulation:  
 
• Induction & ladle metallurgy furnaces 1,000MW 
• Air liquefaction 1,000MW 
• Gas & water pumping with variable speed motor drives 
• Electrolysis: >14,000MW 
− Aluminum 6,500MW 
− Chlor-alkali 4,500MW 
− Potassium hydroxide 1,000MW 
− Magnesium, sodium chlorate, copper 
 
Interestingly, it is likely that electronically controlled responsive loads could provide 
regulation of significantly greater value than that provided by conventional generation. 
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Figure 12 Regulation provides the minute-to-minute balancing of generation and 
load. 
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Thermal generators often do not follow regulation requests closely as shown in Figure 13. 
A load with a solid state control may follow regulation commands perfectly. This may 
reduce the power system’s regulation requirements. If the load incurs little incremental 
cost for response (given the capital cost to make the load ready to respond, the 
opportunity costs for changing production schedules, and the efficiency losses associated 
with controlling the process) the load may become the preferred regulation resource. 
Figure 14 compares the actual power system regulation requirement from a 30,000 MW 
control area before and after an ideal 50 MW regulation resource was simulated. While 
the total 250 MW regulation requirement is only reduced by 50 MW it is clear that the 
remaining 200 MW of regulation is exercised far less after the 50 MW ideal regulator is 
deployed. It may be appropriate to pay the ideal regulator more than other slower and less 
accurate sources of regulation. Clearly more research is required to determine if this 
speculation is accurate but given the cost of regulation the research is certainly justified. 
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Figure 13 Thermal generators often fail to follow regulation commands closely. 
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Figure 14 The 250 MW regulation requirement of a 30,000 MW control area 
(left) is significantly reduced in terms of swing duration and swing frequency 
with the deployment of a simulated 50 MW of ideal regulation resource (right).
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N. Do current reliability rules discriminate against responsive load? 
 
There are a number of obstacles to the greater use of demand response. Many obstacles 
are associated with the way power system reliability rules are written and the consequent 
limitations imposed on load response when used as a resource. Reliability rules are often, 
understandably, written around the capabilities of the supply resources. There is little 
point in asking for response that is simply unavailable. This has little adverse impact 
when there is a uniform pool of resources to draw from and when the resources have little 
control over their response. It does have an adverse impact, however, when a new type of 
resources (demand response) tries to enter the mix. When multiple types of resources 
become available with varying capabilities and limitations the system requirements need 
to be reevaluated and specified in terms of the basic power system reliability needs rather 
than in terms of the capabilities of one type of resource. It is particularly important to 
separate familiarity and comfort with past performance from genuine system 
requirements. 
 
There are many examples of features of reliability rules that accommodate generator 
limitations that do not increase system reliability. They are necessary to enable generators 
to provide the desired reliability response but they are not themselves directly related to 
that desired reliability response. A partial list includes: 
• Minimum run times 
• Minimum off times 
• Minimum load 
• Ramp time for spinning reserve 
• Accommodation of inaccurate response 
• Limiting regulation range within operating range to accommodate coal pulverizer 
configuration 
 
It is not that these accommodations should be revoked. They are necessary to elicit the 
reliability response the power system requires. Similar accommodations should be 
afforded to other technologies based on their limitations, however. A partial list might 
include: 
• Maximum run time 
• Value capacity that is coincident with system load 
• Value response speed 
• Value response accuracy 
• Match metering requirements to resource characteristics 
 
O. Should system operators encourage and facilitate load response? 
 
This question is complicated by the natures of the corporate entities involved in today’s 
power system. Regional reliability councils and ISOs are required to be independent and 
not favor one technology or one solution over another. This is good. But this 
independence may inadvertently place load response at a fundamental disadvantage. 
Generation owners and investors will, naturally, advocate for their interests with 
reliability and market rule setting bodies. They can and should expend considerable effort 
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to do so because they are exclusively in the electric power business. Conversely, loads 
are not primarily in the electric power business. They use electric power to facilitate their 
primary objectives. They can not afford to expend the same effort on electric power 
issues as generators. Companies that specialize in load response facilitate that response 
but do not own the basic resources (the loads). Further, there are transmission and 
generation planning organizations within almost every RTO, ISO, and regional council. It 
would be rare indeed to find a responsive load planning organization with the same level 
of support. This results in a situation with strong advocates for, and significant 
infrastructure supporting, generation and transmission solutions but relatively little 
support for load response solutions.1  In one sense demand resources are treated perfectly 
equitably; they simply can not meet the published system requirements. In another sense 
demand resources are treated inequitably because the reliability rules are often written 
around generator capabilities rather than around system reliability requirements. 
 
If there are societal benefits to be gained by using load response to enhance the reliability 
and economy of the power system a simple neutrality that equally evaluates any 
generation, transmission, or responsive load based proposal offered in the current 
competitive environment may not be sufficient. Load response alternatives may need to 
be advocated just as generation and transmission solutions are advocated. Because 
society benefits from load response it may be appropriate for organizations that husband 
the societal interests in the power system to insure that load response solutions are fully 
considered, even absent a strong commercial advocate. This may be different than simply 
insuring that any proposed alternatives get an equal hearing. (Kirby, 2006) 
 
P. Why not deploy responsive loads sequentially to meet the duration 
requirement? 
 
Some loads would find it difficult to commit to regularly providing the two hour response 
often included in the specification of spinning reserve response. An air conditioning load 
might be able to regularly provide a 30 minute response but be willing to commit to a two 
hour response only if that was called upon very infrequently. While considering this 
apparent limitation in response capability it is important to keep in mind that contingency 
response is typically required for only a few minutes. Times when longer response is 
required are very important for power system reliability but they are infrequent. Also, the 
two hour response requirement was instituted when generators were the only reserve 
supplier. Generators are typically indifferent to the deployment response duration so there 
was no incentive to critically determine the real response duration need. Specifying a 
longer duration had no cost or consequence. In fact, some generators have a minimum 
response limitation. 
 
It is certainly possible for aggregations of responsive loads to meet any desired duration 
requirement but this is not a good idea. Figure 15 shows two alternative approaches to 
                                                 
1  Ancillary service rules provide an example. Rules governing the provision of ancillary services by 
generators often provide detailed accommodation to the limitations of generators. Minimum start times, 
minimum run times, ramp rates, minimum loads, and regulation range limitations are all accommodated. 
Similar accommodations for demand resources are only beginning to be made. 
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using a fleet of responsive loads that can only supply 30 minutes of response each. In one 
case (blue) the aggregation is split into four blocks which are scheduled to be deployed 
sequentially to maintain the potential for two hours of response. In the other case (red) 
the entire load is deployed immediately providing four times the response but for only 30 
minutes. Establishing rules that require the load aggregator to present the system operator 
with only the first response option make no sense. From a power system reliability 
perspective this denies the system operator access to ¾ of an excellent spinning reserve 
resource during the most critical initial stages of a system emergency. It also denies the 
system operator the use of ¾ of the resource for the full length of the vast majority of 
contingency reserve deployments. If the system operator prefers the longer response 
during a specific event the “red” resource is always available to provide the longer “blue” 
response; simply deploy the block groups sequentially by system operator command.  
 
 
Establishing rules that require the load aggregator to present the system operator with the 
longer response is also bad for the responsive loads because they only receive one quarter 
of the payment that they would get if they were fully utilized. This makes it more 
difficult to recover the capital cost for the communications and control equipment. While 
it reduces (nearly eliminates) the response that most of the loads provide (groups 2-4) this 
has little benefit for the loads. If they were unwilling or unable to respond they would not 
be offering spinning reserve. 
 
Q. How is it that a responsive load can provide more capacity by supplying 
spinning reserve than by providing peak reduction? 
 
Many loads can not curtail consumption for the multiple hours required to reduce the 
peak load. They cycle on and off during the peak reduction, consuming less than they 
would have on a normal day but still consuming some energy.  They can respond quickly 
enough to provide spinning reserve, however, and can sustain that response consuming 
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nothing for the duration of the contingency event. LIPA Edge is a typical peak demand 
reduction project that provides a good example. It could provide nearly three times the 
capacity in spinning reserve that it supplies for peak reduction.  
 
Remotely controllable Carrier Comfort Choice thermostats coupled with two-way 
communication provided by Silicon Energy and Skytel two-way pagers allows the Long 
Island Power Authority (LIPA) to monitor capability and response as well as to control 
load reductions. It also enables customers to control their individual thermostats via the 
Internet, a benefit that motivates participation (LIPA 2002a). Currently controlling 
25,000 residential units and 5,000 small commercial units provides 36 MW of peak load 
reduction. (Marks 2006) 
 
The blue curve in Figure 16 shows the aggregate air conditioning load on a hot summer 
day. The green curve shows 25 MW of peak reduction that this system provides. The 
entire load (blue curve) can be curtailed for a spinning reserve event, however, providing 
75 MW of response. Detailed discussions with Carrier revealed that the technology is fast 
enough to provide spinning reserve and provides ample monitoring capability at little or 
no additional cost at times of heavy system loading; this is a significant benefit for 
capacity-constrained Long Island. Significant spinning reserve capability remains even if 
the system is being used for peak reduction. 
Figure 16 Significant spinning reserve capability remains even when demand 
reduction is in effect, as shown in this 8/14/2002 curtailment. 
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R. Will using responsive loads hurt power system stability?  
 
When implemented correctly load response can improve power system stability. Loads 
providing spinning reserve must respond to power system frequency deviations, just as 
spinning reserve generators do. It is true that load response does not include the 
stabilizing inertia provided by large generators. Load can provide full response much 
more quickly than generation, however. Generation typically takes the full ten minutes 
allowed for ramping up spinning reserve response while responsive load can typically 
provide its full response in cycles to seconds for a frequency disturbance. An example 
where responsive load provides superior spinning reserve when compared with 
generation can be seen in Figure 17. Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) 
interconnection frequency response is shown for the sudden loss of the Palo Verde unit 1 
generator. The lower red curve shows system frequency response with generators 
providing all of the spinning reserve. The upper blue curve shows that system frequency 
would not dip as low and would recover more quickly if 300 MW of spinning reserve 
were provided by a large pumping load instead of from generation. (Kueck and Kirby 
2005) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 WECC system stability is enhanced when 300 MW of responsive load 
(upper blue curve) replaces an equal amount of generation (lower red curve). 
Stability runs performed by Donald Davies of WECC.
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S. Do customer overrides and voluntary response reduce the reliability value of 
load response? 
 
Customer overrides are a concern but less so for loads providing ancillary services than 
for loads providing peak load reduction. Load response programs often find that they 
must accommodate voluntary response in order to increase participation. This is not 
surprising. While the cost of electricity is important to most consumers it is only one of 
many costs. Loads often find it impossible to make firm, long-term curtailment 
commitments because there is some chance that external events (external to the power 
system) will prevent them from reducing power consumption when requested. Even if a 
customer is able to respond 99% of the time, the other 1% of the time may be perceived 
to be of such high importance that the load is unwilling to participate in a curtailment 
program. This reaction is surprisingly universal; it can be true for residential as well as 
commercial and industrial customers. Manual override provides an alternative with 
benefits for both the power system and the customer. The advantage to the power system 
is that this option increases the load participation and likely reduces the required 
compensation. The advantage to the customer is that it can opt out of a particular 
curtailment if the inconvenience or cost for the specific event is unusually high.  
 
The natural fear from the power system side is that many customers will always opt out. 
Manual override is less of a problem when spinning reserve and contingency response is 
being supplied than when the peak load is being reduced for two reasons. Contingency 
event duration is shorter and natural human inertia and the slow temperature rise prevents 
customer response within the typical spinning reserve deployment event as shown in 
Figure 18 (Kirby 2003). But there is a technical solution as well. Carrier’s 
ComfortChoice responsive thermostats, for example, offer the power system operator the 
additional option of distinguishing between events that the customer can override and 
events that the customer cannot. This provides the customer with the ability to opt out of 
longer demand reduction events while blocking the override during shorter contingency 
events. 
 
T. Is real-time monitoring needed or practical for responsive load? Does 
statistical response help? 
 
Real-time supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) monitoring is currently 
required for the large generators that typically provide reliability reserves to the power 
system. Similar real-time monitoring is appropriate when large loads provide reliability 
reserves. Traditional monitoring may be too expensive for large numbers of small 
responsive loads, however, but it also may not be necessary to obtain the same level of 
reliability we currently enjoy when large generators supply contingency reserves.  
 
Contingency reserve resources are closely monitored for three distinct reasons: (1) to 
inform the system operator of the availability of reserves before they are needed, (2) to 
monitor deployment events in real time so that the system operator can take corrective 
action in case of a reserve failure, and (3) to monitor individual performance so that 
compensation motivates future performance. Because the same monitoring system 
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provides all three functions, we often fail to distinguish between these functions. For 
small loads, it may be better to look at each function separately. 
The first two reasons to monitor generators in real time (to inform the system operator of 
the resource availability and to inform the system operator of the resource actual 
performance) are required because no matter how reliable any individual generator (or 
load) is there is always a chance that the generator will fail to respond when needed. 
When a large amount of reserves are being supplied by a single generator (or load) the 
loss of that reserve has a significant reliability impact. The system operator must 
immediately replace any unavailable or unresponsive resource.  
 
Large aggregations of small resources inherently behave differently than small numbers 
of large resources; monitoring requirements may therefore be different. While there is no 
absolute guarantee that any physical resource will be able to provide a specific response 
at any specific time, large generators have dedicated staff, extensive monitoring and 
control, and strong economic incentives to actually provide the response they are 
contracted to provide. Loads, especially small loads, do not have the same staffing or 
equipment resources. Interestingly there is good reason to believe that the inherent 
reliability of the response from aggregations of small loads is actually better than the 
reliability of response from large generators. (Kirby, 2003) 
 
Aggregations of small responsive loads can provide greater reliability than fewer 
numbers of large generators, as illustrated in Figure 19. In this simple example, 
contingency reserves are being supplied by six generators that can each provide 100 MW 
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Figure 18 Statistics from the LIPA Edge program show that manual override is 
not a problem during the spinning reserve time frame. 
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of response with 95% reliability. There is a 74% chance that all six generators will 
respond to a contingency event and a 97% probability that at least five will respond, 
which implies a nontrivial chance that fewer than five will respond. This can be 
contrasted to the performance from an aggregation of 1200 responsive loads of 500 kW 
each with only 90% reliability each. This aggregation typically delivers 540 MW (as 
opposed to 600 MW) but never delivers less than 520 MW. As this example illustrates, 
the aggregate load response is much more predictable and the response that the system 
operator can “count on” is actually greater. 
 
  
Monitoring requirements should be based on the reliability requirements of the system, 
recognizing that large deterministic resources present a different monitoring requirement 
than aggregations of small statistical resources in order to achieve the same system 
reliability. 
 
U. Will demand response forecast errors adversely impact reliability?  
 
Power system operators do not usually think in terms of forecasting the availability of 
reliability reserves. They contract for generator response and expect it to be there when 
called upon. The statistical nature of aggregated load response, however, lends itself to 
useful forecasting in place of real-time monitoring. Load response forecasting errors for 
large aggregations of small responding loads are fortunately correlated with overall load 
forecasting errors. If total load is higher than the forecast so are available contingency 
reserves. When available contingency reserves are less than the forecast so is actual load 
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Figure 19 Larger numbers of individually less reliable responsive loads can provide 
greater aggregate reliability than fewer large generators. 
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and other generation which was scheduled to serve load is available to provide the 
reserves. 
 
Forecasting errors for load-supplied reserves can be more easily accommodated than 
forecast errors for the total load. A 10% error in the load forecast for a 30,000 MW 
balancing authority can result in a 3000 MW supply shortfall; a serious operating 
problem. A 10% error in 600 MW of expected reserve response from responsive load can 
be handled by derating the resource and calling for 10% more response than is needed. 
This derating can be refined as experience is gained. 
 
V. Should demand response be treated as a regulated asset? 
 
Large loads that provide reliability services will likely want to be treated as commercial 
entities in the ancillary service markets. Their participation will be motivated by the 
markets’ financial rewards for performance. In that sense they are very like large 
generators.  
 
Small loads, especially residential loads, may be less motivated by and less able to 
participate in commercial ancillary service markets on their own. Electricity is only a 
small portion of their overall economic concerns. Still, they represent a large reliability 
resource with technical capabilities that are well matched to the power system’s 
reliability needs; a potentially large societal benefit. If commercial aggregators are unable 
to combine loads and enable their market participation it may be appropriate to treat 
responsive loads as a regulated resource. 
 
Transmission is almost always a regulated asset. Transmission facilitates rather than 
participates in the electricity market; it supports reliability. Costs are fully covered 
through the rate base. It is not motivated by energy market performance. Some large 
aggregations of small responsive loads have these characteristics as well. Some 
responsive residential load programs offer little economic motivation. Instead customers 
are motivated by a communal spirit of improving reliability, reducing pollution, and 
holding down overall costs. These resources could be treated as regulated assets with the 
capital and operating costs recovered through the rate base. The reliability response 
would be provided to the system operator at no cost and used to reduce the amount of 
purchased ancillary services.  
 
Responsive load could be treated as a regulated reliability asset that the system operator 
uses to optimize the operation of the power system. Load response would then be like 
other transmission assets such as capacitor banks and FACTS devices; equipment that’s 
cost is recovered by including it in the rate base or transmission tariff. This might be 
especially appropriate in cases where the load response is not driven primarily by energy 
market considerations and where the economic viability of the program is not driven by 
the loads’ opportunity costs. The cost of residential load response providing contingency 
reserves or peak reduction, for example, is dominated by the cost of communications and 
control, not by the response payment to the customer. Many customers receive no 
ongoing compensation. The communications and control could be considered part of the 
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SCADA system and the resource offered to the system operator as one more tool for 
maximizing transmission performance at minimal cost. Interestingly, involuntary load 
shedding is treated exactly this way. 
 
W. Do NERC rules address demand response? 
 
There is surprisingly little in the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC) 
reliability rules concerning demand response in general or the use of demand response for 
power system reliability. NERC is, of course, important to any discussion of power 
system reliability. It is the industry organization which addresses power system reliability 
for Canada, the U.S., and part of Mexico and has been selected by FERC to be the 
national Electric Reliability Organization (ERO). The voluntary structure of NERC’s past 
reliability rules is being replaced with enforceable reliability rules approved by FERC but 
the process is only partially completed.  
 
Demand response is not treated extensively in current NERC standards. The Modeling, 
Data, and Analysis (MOD) standards and the Transmission Planning (TPL) standards 
require those responsible for generating load forecasts to include (and document) 
controllable demand side management in the forecast if it exists. Depending on 
interpretation they may also require collecting data on demand side management 
performance. The NERC standards do not provide guidance on how or how much load 
response should be used. They only provide guidance on how to report load response 
capability. 
 
The NERC “Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards” presents a concern. 
(NERC 2006 A) In it “Spinning Reserve” is defined as “unloaded generation that is 
synchronized and ready to serve additional demand” (emphasis added). In the recent past 
the Glossary has not been considered to be binding and specific requirements have been 
derived instead from the individual standards themselves. The increasing formality that is 
part of NERC’s transformation into the ERO, coming under FERC jurisdiction, and 
making NERC standards truly mandatory may give added legal weight to the Glossary. In 
the worst case this could disqualify PJM and ERCOT’s use of demand response as 
spinning reserve. Interestingly, the glossary also defines “Operating Reserves – 
Spinning” as “The portion of Operating Reserve consisting of: Generation synchronized 
to the system and fully available to serve load within the Disturbance Recovery Period 
following the contingency event; or Load fully removable from the system within the 
Disturbance Recovery Period following the contingency event.” It is not clear which 
definition applies and if responsive load is allowed by NERC rules to supply spinning 
reserve. 
 
X. How do Regional Reliability Councils treat reliability demand response? 
 
All of the regional reliability councils allow demand response to be used as non-spinning 
and supplemental operating reserves. Most do not allow loads to provide spinning reserve 
but two regions, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) and Reliability First 
Corporation (RFC) allow responsive load to provide spinning reserve. RFC changed its 
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rules in the spring of 2006 to allow loads to participate in all of PJM’s ancillary service 
markets. 
 
ERCOT obtains ancillary services and balancing energy (15 minutes) through markets. 
While ERCOT does simultaneous selection of ancillary service resources it does not 
force ancillary service providers into the energy market. ERCOT allows loads to provide 
spinning reserve but currently limits load to providing half of the total 2300 MW 
requirement until system operators gain further experience (Mickey, 2006) ERCOT has 
more loads offering to provide spinning reserve than they can accommodate. Responsive 
loads include air compressors, liquid oxygen plants, oil well fields, a cooperative’s 15 
MW residential feeder, and an aluminum smelting plant. (Kueck-Patterson, 2006) 
Interestingly, though over 1600 MW of load offer to provide spinning reserve not a single 
load has offered to provide balancing energy. This may indicate that load response 
duration is more limited than response speed.  
 
The Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO) is in the midst of ancillary service 
market design and the supply rules are not yet clear. 
 
Markets for ancillary services typically develop shortly after markets for energy are 
established. The interdependence between the supply of energy and ancillary services 
makes this natural. Table 3 summarizes the current state of load participation in ancillary 
service markets.  
 
Table 3 Current and pending ancillary service markets (adapted from MISO 2006) 
  Operating Reserves  
 Regulation Spinning Non-spinning 
Supplemental 
(10 min) 
Long Term 
Supplemental 
(30 min) 
Replacement 
(60 min) 
Co-
optimization 
exemption 
ISO-NE ? ? ? L ? L  No 
NYISO ? ? ? L ? L  No 
PJM ? L ?&C L ?&C L   Yes 
MISO C C C   Not yet set 
ERCOT ? ? L  ? L ? L Yes 
CAISO ? ? ? L   Yes 
? – Market based 
C – Cost based 
F – Fixed monthly MVAR payment 
L – Responsive load is allowed to participate 
 
Y. Do capacity markets help or hurt demand response? 
 
Peak reducing demand response is frequently treated well in regions with capacity 
markets or capacity obligations. Reducing the peak demand has the added benefit that the 
reserve margin is reduced as well. Responsive loads providing ancillary services often do 
not fair as well. ISO-NE’s use of capacity markets designed around generation, for 
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example, makes it difficult for responsive loads to receive the same payment that 
generators receive and also reduce loads’ ability to participate in the ancillary service 
markets. Forward capacity markets mean that reserve costs are mostly sunk in real time 
and rational real time offers are expected to clear at $0. Further, ISO-NE utilizes forward 
reserve auctions, two to five months in advance, to procure ten minute non-spinning 
reserve and thirty minute operating reserves. These are difficult commitments for 
responsive loads to make. These markets are designed to satisfy 95% of the reserve 
requirements and include penalties for failure to respond in real time. Any resource can 
participate but it must look like a low capacity generator with a high energy price and 
capable of providing reserves 98% of the time. (DePillis, 2006) 
 
A responsive load can also register as a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand (DARD), in 
which case it will essentially be treated as a generator. The load can not restrict its 
response to contingency events; energy and ancillary services are co-optimized based 
upon the bid response price. Submitting a $999/MWH only partially mitigates the energy 
deployment risk and also undesirably reduces contingency event deployments. (DePillis, 
2006) 
 
Demand response programs are also sometimes economically disadvantaged in areas with 
formal capacity markets. Some markets impose an artificial requirement that response 
must be available 24 hours a day, all season long, for example. This is reasonable when 
the only source of response is generation whose availability is typically not time variant. 
Some load is not available to respond in blocks of a set size but it is always available 
when the power system is most heavily loaded and most stressed; at the time of the daily 
load peak. Figure 20 shows the stack-up of required capacity in real time. Figure 21 
shows the coincidence of air conditioning load with total system load, justifying crediting 
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Figure 20 Ancillary services contribute to capacity requirements just as peak load 
requirements do. 
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responsive air conditioning with full capacity credit. The ancillary services of regulation, 
spinning and non-spinning reserve are needed just as much as capacity that is delivering 
real-power to serve load. Responsive load that is always available at times of system peak 
should receive full capacity credit. 
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Figure 21 The air-conditioning load matches the total load daily profile, as shown on 
this Monday, July 29, 2002. 
 
Z. Why is it so difficult for new technologies to gain acceptance in supplying 
power system reliability? 
 
The power industry is understandably and correctly risk averse in addressing reliability. 
The integrated power system must function 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. The health, 
safety, and economy of the nation depend on the reliability of the power system. On rare, 
but not rare enough, occasions blackouts have cascaded to impact tens of millions of 
people. The industry is wisely slow in adopting new technologies and new methods.  
 
Restructuring of the industry has added a further complication for demand response. 
While restructuring provides many benefits (including clearer market signals that loads 
can respond to) it does make testing new technologies difficult. Reliability rules and 
market structures are complex and in some ways delicate. This is more true in the 
competitive market environment of today than it was in the vertically integrated 
environment of the past. Market participants will, quite rightly, carefully analyze the 
rules and behave in whatever manner maximizes their profits within those rules. System 
reliability can be jeopardized if poorly thought out rules are put in place. Consequently 
market designers and reliability engineers are cautious about changing rules without good 
cause lest those changes have unintended consequences. 
 
   
 32 
Reluctance to change rules can adversely impact new technologies and generate a 
chicken-or-egg problem. Technologies that are blocked from the market by current rules 
can not develop. Undeveloped technologies do not represent sufficient market force to 
warrant changing the rules to accommodate them. This is especially true for load 
response technologies which often require cooperation among a large number of entities. 
A load aggregator can not interest loads in being responsive until the rules allow the 
specific response and state what is required to provide it. Market designers will not 
consider changing market rules to accommodate load response technologies until they 
clearly see that there are sufficient MWs of response to make the effort worthwhile. 
Aggregators will not invest in response technology until the rules are clear and the loads 
are willing to respond.  
 
Testing new technologies is more difficult in the new restructured environment as well. 
Most ISOs do not have research budgets. It is very difficult for them to decide to conduct 
a limited test on a new technology. Their market rules are developed through large, slow 
consensus processes. Any test has to be agreed upon through the same slow, deliberative 
process. Simply allocating the cost of a test is often contentious and prevents progress.  
 
AA. Is co-optimization compatible with demand response? 
 
Co-optimization (also called joint optimization, simultaneous optimization, or rational 
buying) minimizes the total cost of energy, regulation, and contingency reserves by 
allowing the substitution of “higher value” services for “lower value” services.  If a 
generator offers spinning reserve at $8/MW-hr, for example, and other generators are 
offering non-spinning reserve at $12/MW-hr the co-optimizer will use the spinning 
reserve resource for non-spinning reserves (instead of the non-spinning reserves offered) 
and pay it the spinning reserve clearing price. Co-optimization has many benefits. It 
encourages generators to bid in with their actual costs for energy and each of the ancillary 
services. When they do so the co-optimizer is able to simultaneously minimize overall 
system costs and maximize individual generator profits.  
 
Unfortunately, co-optimization can effectively bar responsive loads as well as emissions-
limited generators and water-limited hydro generators from offering to provide ancillary 
services. An aggregation of commercial refrigerators might be ideal providers of spinning 
reserve, for example. They could be instantaneously frequency responsive. They could 
respond to system operator commands much faster and more accurately than 
conventional generation. They might have nearly zero response cost (other than the initial 
capital cost). They might be able to easily sustain response for 30 to 60 minutes. But they 
would be completely unable to provide 8, 12, or 24 hour response. If there was a risk that 
their attractive offer to provide spinning reserve could be exercised as an energy source 
they would simply not enter the market. The power system would be denied the benefit of 
this excellent reliability resource.  
 
Many responsive loads differ from most generators in that the cost of response rises with 
response duration. An air conditioning load, for example, incurs almost no cost when it 
provides a ten minute interruption but incurs unacceptable costs when it provides a six 
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hour interruption. Conversely a generator typically incurs startup and shutdown costs 
even for short responses but only has ongoing fuel costs associated with its response 
duration. In fact, many generators have minimum run times and minimum shutdown 
times. This low-cost-for-short-duration-response (coupled with fast response speed) 
makes some responsive loads ideal for providing spinning reserve but less well suited for 
providing energy response or peak reduction. 
 
Unfortunately current market rules in New York and New England let the ISOs dispatch 
capacity assigned to reserves for economic reasons as well as reliability purposes. As 
long as the ISO has enough spinning and non-spinning reserve capacity to cover 
contingencies, it will dispatch any remaining resources economically regardless of 
whether that capacity is labeled as contingency reserve or not. Ancillary service and 
energy suppliers are automatically co-optimized. 
 
This policy works well for most generators but causes severe problems for loads that 
need to limit the duration or frequency of their response to occasional contingency 
conditions.2 Loads can submit very high energy bids in an attempt to be the last resource 
called but this is still no guarantee that they will not be used as a multi-hour energy 
resource. Submitting a high cost energy bid also means that the load will be used less 
frequently for contingency response than is economically optimal. Price caps on energy 
bids further limit the ability of the loads to control how long they are deployed for.  
 
The basic problem is that the co-optimizer is unable to recognize a cost curve that rises 
with time. This is opposite from most generators’ characteristic of declining cost curves 
(fixed transition costs spread over an increasing number of hours) which are 
accommodated. Most generators incur startup or transition costs. Many ISOs allow 
generators to specify these costs in their bids. These costs are spread over the length of 
the deployment. If 100 MW of generation is used for an hour a $1000 startup cost would 
add $10/MWH to the energy bid. The cost adder would be $5/MWH if the generation 
were run for two hours. Even if the startup cost is not explicitly accommodated the 
generator can factor it into the bid based on an expected operating duration. Generator 
profits typically rise with longer deployments and co-optimization. There is no similar 
accommodation of costs that rise with time.  
 
Fortunately there is a simple solution. California had this problem with their rational 
buyer but changed their market rules and now allows resources to flag themselves as 
available for contingency response only. PJM allows resources to establish different 
prices for each service and energy providing a partial solution. ERCOT does not have the 
problem because most energy is supplied through bilateral arrangements that the ISO is 
not part of. Energy and ancillary service markets are separate. Possibly as a consequence 
half of ERCOT’s contingency response comes from responsive load (the maximum 
currently allowed) while no loads offer to supply balancing energy.  
 
 
                                                 
2 Co-optimization often does not work for energy or emissions limited generators either. 
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3. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS 
 
Responsive load remains the largest underutilized reliability resource available to the 
North American power system today. Many loads have response characteristics that are 
technically well matched to the power system reliability needs. Unfortunately, market 
and reliability rules were developed when generators were the only resources available to 
the system operator. Consequently those rules often prohibit load response, especially for 
the fastest, most critical, and most expensive reliability services. 
 
This report examined a range of common concerns often expressed about load response. 
The advantages and disadvantages of utilizing load response have been discussed. 
Hopefully the report has shown that many of the commonly held biases against utilizing 
load response for reliability are no longer valid. Demand response is not a perfect 
reliability resource, but neither is generation. Some loads can respond much faster to 
reliability events than most generators making them more valuable than generation. 
Power system stability can be enhanced by the appropriate use of responsive load. 
Providing reliability services is a better match to the physical capabilities of some 
responsive loads than peak reduction or energy efficiency. Encouraging responsive loads 
to provide reliability services, including spinning reserve, can free up generating capacity 
to provide energy.  
 
Reliability council rules should be changed to capture the full potential that load response 
offers. The inherent characteristics of demand response should be accommodated, just as 
the inherent characteristics of generation are accommodated. Recognize that some 
responsive loads have maximum run times. Recognize the statistical nature of demand 
response from aggregations of numerous small loads. Recognize that the monitoring and 
communications requirements to maintain system reliability are fundamentally different 
for aggregations of large numbers of small resources than they are for fewer large 
resources. Recognize the coincidence of demand response capability and total system 
load and allocate appropriate capacity credit to demand response. Accommodate 
voluntary response and perform the research required to establish the level of reliable 
response capability. Assure that co-optimizers properly recognize the capabilities and 
characteristics of demand resources and do not let them force entities to provide services 
they are not capable of providing. Develop better load response forecasting tools for 
system operators to increase the usefulness and acceptability of demand response. 
 
Enable a mechanism that allows regional organizations to test new technologies without 
having to first permanently restructure markets. Include a mechanism to fund such tests. 
Consider treating some demand response resources as regulated transmission assets 
available for reliability response rather than as competitive entities acting in the energy 
markets. Given the societal benefits, it may be appropriate for independent transmission 
planning organizations to take a more proactive role in drawing demand response 
alternatives into the resource mix. Existing demand response programs provide a 
technical basis to build from. 
   
 35 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
 
This work was coordinated by the Consortium for Electric Reliability Technology 
Solutions for the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy 
Reliability. It is based upon research efforts concerning ancillary services and responsive 
load which has been supported for many years by Phil Overholt and the Department Of 
Energy. Thanks go to John Kueck, Fangxing Li, and Stan Hadley for reviewing a draft of 
the paper. 
   
 36 
REFERENCES 
 
M. DePillis, 2006, The New Ancillary Services Markets of New England, MISO Ancillary 
Services Round Table, 26 April 
 
FERC 1996, Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by 
Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order 888, Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission, May 
 
FERC Staff, 2006, Assessment of Demand Response and Advanced Metering, Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission, Docket AD-06-2-000, August 
 
E. Hirst and B. Kirby, 2003, Opportunities for Demand Participation in New England 
Contingency Reserve Markets, New England Demand Response Initiative technical paper, 
February 
B. Kirby, 2006, The Role of Demand Resources In Regional Transmission Expansion 
Planning and reliable Operations, ORNL/TM-2006/512, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 
July 
 
B. Kirby, 2003, Spinning Reserve From Responsive Loads, ORNL/TM-2003/19, Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory, March 
 
B. Kirby and E. Hirst, 2003, Technical Issues related to Retail Load Provision of 
Ancillary Services, New England Demand Response Initiative technical paper, February 
 
J. Kueck and B. Kirby, 2005, Presentation to the WECC CMOPS, 7 January 
 
J. Kueck and M. Patterson, 2006, telephone interview, October 
 
J. Mickey, 2006, Competitive Ancillary Services Market in ERCOT, MISO Ancillary 
Services Round Table, 26 April 
 
MISO 2006, Ancillary Services Round Table, Midwest Independent System Operator, 
Carmel Indiana, April 26-27 
 
NERC, 2006A, Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards, North American 
Electric Reliability Council, Princeton, NJ, May 2 
 
NERC, 2006B, Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of North America,  
North American Electric Reliability Council, Princeton, NJ, February 7, Downloaded 
from www.nerc.com on 20 March, 2006 
